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“CYBORG JUSTICE” AND THE RISK OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL–LEGAL LOCK-IN 
Rebecca Crootof * 
INTRODUCTION 
An Estonian team is designing an artiﬁcially-intelligent (AI) agent to 
adjudicate claims of €7,000 or less, with the aim of clearing case backlog.1 
The pilot version will focus on contract disputes: An algorithm will ana-
lyze uploaded documents to reach an initial decision, which can then be 
appealed to a human judge.2 This is but one of many examples of how AI 
is increasingly being incorporated into adjudicatory or adjudicatory-adja-
cent processes, ranging from the relatively minor to the most signiﬁcant 
determinations.3 For example, DoNotPay, an AI-based chatbot originally 
designed to assist with parking ticket appeals, now offers a panoply of 
legal services, including helping individuals report suspected discrimina-
tion, request maternity leave, and seek compensation for transit delays.4 
Companies rely on automated processes to resolve customer complaints,5 
                                                                                                                           
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; Affiliated 
Fellow, Information Society Project. This Piece is based on remarks given at the Columbia 
Law Review’s 2019 Symposium, “Common Law for the Age of AI,” in response to Tim Wu’s 
Law’s End? manuscript. Many thanks to BJ Ard, Douglas Bernstein, Hannah Bloch-Wehba, 
Jennifer Dayrit, Frank Pasquale, Richard Re, Alicia Solow-Niederman, and Harry Surden 
for clarifying edits and suggestions. I am also indebted to those who have thought far 
longer on the immediate and long-term promises and pitfalls of incorporating AI into the 
judicial process. See, e.g., pretty much everyone thanked above and cited below. 
 1. Eric Niiler, Can AI Be a Fair Judge in Court? Estonia Thinks So, WIRED (Mar. 
25, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/can-ai-be-fair-judge-court-estonia-thinks-so/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z8DH-APBL]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. “Intelligence” is a slippery term. See Shane Legg & Marcus Hutter, A Collection of 
Definitions of Intelligence 2 (2007), https://arxiv.org/pdf/0706.3639.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
K54T-DE34] (surveying various deﬁnitions of “intelligence”). This Piece uses the term 
“artiﬁcial intelligence” broadly, encompassing varied systems and computer programs that 
can assist or replace human decisionmakers. Cf. Harry Surden, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and 
Law: An Overview, 35 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1305, 1307 (2019) [hereinafter Surden, Artiﬁcial 
Intelligence] (deﬁning AI as “using technology to automate tasks that ‘normally require 
human intelligence’”). 
 4. Sebastian Anthony, Chatbot Lawyer, Which Contested £7.2M in Parking 
Tickets, Now Offers Legal Help for 1,000+ Topics, Ars Technica (July 14, 2017), https:// 
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/07/donotpay-chatbot-lawyer-homelessness/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KWC5-V6XD]. 
 5. Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 547, 564–66 
(2016) [hereinafter Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse]. 
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cities depend on automated systems to generate citations for minor 
traffic violations,6 police departments engage data mining systems to 
predict and investigate crime,7 and domestic judges employ algorithms 
throughout the criminal justice process.8 Meanwhile, militaries are 
incorporating increasingly autonomous systems in their targeting and 
detention decisionmaking structures.9 
Although AI is already of use to litigants,10 to legal practitioners,11 
and in predicting legal outcomes,12 we must be cautious and deliberate 
when incorporating AI into the common law judicial process.13 As will be 
discussed in Part I, human beings and machine systems process infor-
mation and reach conclusions in fundamentally different ways, with AI 
being particularly ill-suited for the rule application and value balancing 
                                                                                                                           
 6. Lawrence B. Solum, Artiﬁcially Intelligent Law, BioLaw J., no. 1, 2019, at 53, 58, 
http://rivista.biodiritto.org/ojs/index.php?journal=biolaw&page=article&op=view&path%5B%
5D=351&path%5B%5D=317 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Solum, 
Artiﬁcially Intelligent Law]. 
 7. Andrew Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 109, 113–14 
(2017). 
 8. See, e.g., John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk 
Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 1725, 1729 (2018); Rebecca 
Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice 
System, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1343, 1346–48 (2018). 
 9. Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1837, 1868–72 (2015); Ashley Deeks, Predicting Enemies, 104 Va. L. Rev. 
1529, 1561–63 (2018). 
 10. See Anthony, supra note 4 (describing how an AI-driven chatbot provides free 
legal services). 
 11. See Surden, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, supra note 3, at 1329–31 (discussing the utility 
and limitations of AI-assisted document review in discovery). 
 12. Id. at 1331–32. 
 13. There are similar and distinct reasons to be concerned about how algorithmic 
decisionmaking may affect government decisionmaking more broadly. See, e.g., Hannah 
Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript 
at 6–9), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3355776 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (catalog-
ing proprietary algorithmic governance programs and discussing the potential utility of 
transparency mechanisms); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. 
L. Rev. 1249, 1252–55 (2008) (considering how to maintain due process protections in an 
increasingly automated administrative state). Relatedly, concerns regarding these and 
private uses of algorithmic decisionmaking are prompting calls for regulating it writ large. 
E.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to 
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 104–10), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3351404 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (proposing 
a hybrid model of individual process rights and systemic regulation through collaborative 
governance of algorithmic decisionmaking); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The 
Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1089–90 (2018) 
(cataloging concerns with algorithmic decisionmaking). While relevant to those discussions, 
this Piece focuses on the issues relevant to the use of AI in U.S. common law adjudication. 
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often required of human judges. Nor will “cyborg justice”14—hybrid 
human–AI judicial systems that would attempt to marry the best of 
human and machine decisionmaking and minimize the drawbacks of 
both—be a panacea.15 Part II notes the beneﬁts of such systems and 
outlines how teaming may create new overtrust, undertrust, and interface 
design problems, as well as second-order, structural side effects. Part III 
explores one such side effect of hybrid human–AI judicial systems, which 
I term “technological–legal lock-in.” Translating rules and decisionmaking 
procedures into algorithms grants them a new kind of permanency, 
which creates an additional barrier to legal evolution. By augmenting the 
common law’s extant conservative bent, hybrid human–AI judicial 
systems risk fostering legal stagnation and an attendant loss of judicial 
legitimacy. 
Cyborg justice systems are proliferating, but their structure has not 
yet stabilized. We now have a bounded opportunity to design systems that 
                                                                                                                           
 14. “Cyborgs” are cybernetic organisms, beings with both organic and biomecha-
tronic body parts. “Cyborg justice” systems are less colorfully described as “hybrid human–
AI judicial systems.” They can be conceptualized generally as augmented decisionmaking 
systems, in which an AI assists a human judge as a kind of career law clerk, Eugene Volokh, 
Chief Justice Robots, 68 Duke L.J. 1135, 1141, 1148–49 (2019), or as a tiered system, in 
which AIs address low-level complaints and cases, which can then be appealed to a human 
reviewer, Niiler, supra note 1. Of course, these structures could be combined: An AI could 
make an initial assessment, which could then be appealed to an AI-assisted human 
decisionmaker. Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially 
Intelligent Justice, 22 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 242, 282–85 (2019), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Re-Solow-Niederman_20190808.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3SKY-ULYK]. 
 15. Many scholars are considering the implications of human–machine teaming in 
the context of adjudicatory decisionmaking. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, 
Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 46–49 (2019) 
(cautioning against AI supplanting human decisionmakers); Re & Solow-Niederman, 
supra note 14, at 262–78 (“AI adjudication will raise at least four kinds of concern: incom-
prehensibility, dataﬁcation, disillusionment, and alienation. Each concern relates to a 
distinctive aspect of human adjudication—namely, understanding, adaptation, trust, and 
participation.”); Volokh, supra note 14, at 1161–77 (responding to theoretical and practi-
cal objections to the use of AI judges); Tim Wu, Will Artiﬁcial Intelligence Eat the Law? 
The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2001, 2001–05 (2019) 
(arguing that AI will be incorporated into, rather than replace, U.S. adjudicatory struc-
tures); Kirsten Martin & Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy and the Legitimacy of Automated 
Decision-Making 23 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) 
(ﬁnding empirically that “including either notiﬁcation or human oversight removes the 
legitimacy penalty of automation”); cf. Paul Scharre, Centaur Warﬁghting: The False 
Choice of Humans vs. Automation, 30 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 151, 151 (2016) (arguing 
that “[h]ybrid human-machine cognitive architectures will be able to leverage the preci-
sion and reliability of automation without sacriﬁcing the robustness and ﬂexibility of hu-
man intelligence”); Andrew Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human Users, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 44–45) [hereinafter Selbst, Negligence], https://ssrn. 
com/id=3350508 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (highlighting that, while AI 
decision assistants are “sold as a remedy to the weakness of human decisionmaking,” 
incorporating AI “does not actually solve bounded rationality; rather, it transforms the 
problem . . . into an inability to completely oversee the decision mechanism”). 
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realize the beneﬁts and mitigate the issues associated with incorporating 
AI into the common law adjudicatory process.16 
I. HUMAN VS. AI JUDGES 
The conversation around whether and when algorithmic 
decisionmaking processes might augment or replace human judges is far 
from new.17 Over the past decade, however, the rise of big data and ad-
vances in computation power have enabled dramatic advances in ma-
chine learning,18 which have fostered a renewed interest in the varied 
societal roles AI might assume. After all, if an algorithm can ﬁle a legal 
complaint, why can’t it decide one? 
Certainly, there is much to critique about the justice of human 
judges.19 They are famously inconsistent, both as a group and as indi-
viduals. Not only will decisions vary from judge to judge,20 any one 
judge’s sensitivity to context and penchant for leniency may vary 
dramatically with whether they are hungry, tired, bored, overworked, 
overwhelmed, or otherwise distracted.21 Further, human judges are an 
inherently expensive and limited resource: They must prepare for years, 
                                                                                                                           
 16. Cf. Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of 
Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 921, 921 (2006) (noting that the 
possibility of changing a technological design becomes less likely over time, due both to 
closure and path dependence); Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The 
Dilemma of Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw, 2018 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 249, 
281 (discussing how the design and uses of new technologies are constructed differently in 
different societies). 
 17. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 Ga. L. 
Rev. 1277, 1277–78 (1977) (speculating in 1977 about whether the search for the “rule of 
law” may be answered by computer programs replacing judges, and if so, whether society 
would beneﬁt). 
 18. E.g., Tim Hwang, Computational Power and the Social Impact of Artiﬁcial 
Intelligence 4–6 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.08971.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8EF-
UQ24]. 
 19. See, e.g., Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 272–73 (discussing how ﬁrms 
interested in marketing AI adjudication will be incentivized to highlight human biases and 
disparage human decisionmakers). 
 20. See Pasquale, supra note 15, at 49 (“[T]here are almost always conﬂicts among 
the approaches of multiple courts to similar sets of facts, irreconcilable by logic or rea-
son.”); Volokh, supra note 14, at 1156–57 (observing that “[h]uman judges, . . . being 
human, have human prejudices” and detailing the many forms they might take). 
 21. See, e.g., Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles 3 
(Sept. 9, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2914649 (on ﬁle 
with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that unexpected losses in Louisiana State 
University football games correlated with local juvenile court judges giving increased sen-
tences for the following week). 
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they take time to decide cases, and they retire. As a result, over and over 
again, justice delayed becomes justice denied.22 
Given human limitations, advocates for legal automation tend to 
view delegating judging to algorithms as the natural next evolutionary 
step toward “a rule of law, not of men.”23 Unlike arbitrary, expensive, and 
temporally and spatially limited human beings, algorithms appear rela-
tively consistent,24 cheap,25 fast,26 scalable,27 and (apparently) impartial,28 
suggesting the possibility of fair access to justice for all. 
Absent a breakthrough in machine intelligence or a complete struc-
tural shift in what we value about the common law process,29 however, 
this idealized AI judge is infeasible. It may be possible to create a pro-
gram that can calculate taxes or make an initial assessment of whether a 
contract has been breached and still be impossible to create a generalist 
program that can apply legal rules in accordance with changing social 
mores. 
This inability stems from the fundamental differences in human and 
machine intelligence. Our familiarity with human intelligence encour-
ages the mistaken assumption that artiﬁcial intelligence operates simi-
larly,30 that it reaches determinations by “engaging in some sort of syn-
thetic computer cognition that matches or surpasses human-level think-
ing.”31 Instead, today’s AI produces results “by detecting patterns in data 
                                                                                                                           
 22. Fred Shapiro, You Can Quote Them, Yale Alumni Mag. (Sept./Oct. 2010), https:// 
yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/2967-you-can-quote-them [https://perma.cc/8239-PDVE] 
(recounting various origins of the saying, “justice delayed is justice denied”). 
 23. Pasquale, supra note 15, at 4 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule 
of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 781 (1989)). 
 24. Martin & Waldman, supra note 15, at 7 (“Consistency is one of a computer’s chief 
advantages over human decision-makers.”); see also Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 
14, at 268–69 (“Flesh-and-blood judges often aspire to consistency throughout their ca-
reers, but they are subject to several forms of natural updating.”). 
 25. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 255–56 (“[F]or any given level of 
technically attainable accuracy, use of AI adjudication would lower costs.”). 
 26. Id. at 255 (noting that “an algorithmic decision procedure that draws on [ma-
chine learning] . . . could almost instantly adjudicate a vast number of cases, limited only 
by computing power and energy resources”). 
 27. Id. (“AI adjudication has a capacity for mass deployment at a scale and speed that 
far exceeds what any human bureaucracy could achieve.”). 
 28. Id. at 256 (“[S]tandardization of the adjudication process itself could make good 
on codiﬁed justice’s promise to eliminate human bias from judicial decision-making.”). 
 29. Id. at 246 (arguing that incorporating AI in the judicial process will foster a shift 
in societal values, favoring codiﬁed justice, which prioritizes standardization, at the ex-
pense of equitable justice, which values discretion and mercy). 
 30. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and 
Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 1217, 1223–24 
(2017) (discussing the “homunculus fallacy”—the “belief that there is a little person in-
side the program who is making it work—who has good intentions or bad intentions, and 
who makes the program do good or bad things”). 
 31. Surden, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, supra note 3, at 1308. 
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and using knowledge, rules, and information that have been speciﬁcally 
encoded by people into forms that can be processed by computers.”32 It 
“excel[s] in narrow, limited settings, like chess, that have particular 
characteristics—often where there are clear right or wrong answers, 
where there are discernable underlying patterns and structures, and 
where fast search and computation provides advantages over human 
cognition.”33 
In contrast, the judgment we value in a common law process is a 
distinctively human skill.34 Human judges are sensitive to context, both to 
extenuating circumstances in individual cases and shifts in social norms 
over time, and can ﬂexibly apply legal rules. While human 
contextualization may be incorporated during the design or training of 
an AI system, that is hardly the same as having human contextualization 
at the time the algorithmic rule is applied, especially as that application 
may occur in a temporally, geographically, and culturally different 
context.35 AI may be consistent, but it is “brittle”: “[It lacks] the ﬂexibility 
humans have to step outside their instructions and apply ‘common sense’ 
to adapt to novel situations.”36 
Human judges have a few additional comparative advantages. While 
both human and AI judges may be black boxes, human judges must give 
reasons for their decisions.37 Because human judges live in the real world 
and internalize social norms, those norms inform and undergird their 
reasoning, which in turn strengthens those norms (for better or worse, 
depending on one’s view of the norm at issue). Additionally—and possi-
bly relatedly—decisions made by human judges currently have a higher 
perception of legitimacy than those of algorithmic judges,38 suggesting 
                                                                                                                           
 32. Id. This description of AI programming roughly encompasses both machine 
learning and rule-based systems, as most AI systems today incorporate elements of both. 
Id. at 1319. 
 33. Id. at 1309. 
 34. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 13 (manuscript at 118–19) (discussing how hu-
man decisionmakers ﬁll in context based on cultural knowledge about appropriate deci-
sional heuristics, including by both expanding the decisional context to include infor-
mation that would be unfair to ignore and circumscribing the decisional context by ignor-
ing information that would be unfair to include). 
 35. Id. (noting that algorithms often are “fed both goals and datasets by humans who 
are . . . remote from a particular decision and [which] are often or even inherently cultur-
ally or contextually incomplete” and that human contextualization is “absent at the end 
point when an algorithm is applied to a particular individual”). 
 36. Scharre, supra note 15, at 151. 
 37. Cf. Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision 
Tools, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1851, 1864 (2019) (“Reason giving is a core requirement in 
conventional decision systems precisely because human decisionmakers are inscrutable and 
prone to bias and error . . . .”). 
 38. A recent empirical study found that the more involved an AI is in a legal decision, 
the lower its perceived legitimacy. Martin & Waldman, supra note 15, at 23. However, the 
data source for the decision—whether the data were gathered speciﬁcally for the decision 
or aggregated by a third party—was far more inﬂuential to the perceived legitimacy than 
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that their decisions are more likely to be accepted and enjoy higher com-
pliance rates.39 
Nor can we translate our statutes and common law into easily ap-
plied rules.40 While it is tempting to imagine law as subject to algorithmic 
application, reality is far messier.41 AI can apply unambiguous rules,42 but 
even apparently simple laws are far from unambiguous. For example, 
different groups of coders were tasked with automating the enforcement 
of New York traffic speed limits.43 Consider what rules you would include. 
Would you issue a ticket for every infraction? What if a driver only went 
four miles-per-hour over the limit? What if they went eight? Would it 
matter what other drivers were doing? Unsurprisingly, programmers 
charged with coding the “Letter of the Law” and the “Intent of the Law” 
differed in many ways, including whether their software ticketed minor 
infractions,44 how much the presumed margin of sensor error was biased 
in favor of the driver,45 the extent to which “clusters” of violations were 
considered single violations,46 and whether there was a minimum inter-
ticket time.47 As a result, for the same scenarios, the “Letter of the Law” 
group issued 498.33 (standard deviation = 453.42) tickets on average, 
                                                                                                                           
the decisionmaker. Id. at 4–5, 21; see also Solum, Artiﬁcially Intelligent Law, supra note 6, 
at 59–61 (discussing how democratic legitimacy, transparency legitimacy, and constitu-
tional role legitimacy would all be implicated by the delegation of legal authority to artiﬁ-
cially intelligent systems). 
 39. Wu, supra note 15, at 2002 (“As between a decision made via software and court 
adjudication, the latter, even if delivering the same results, may yield deeper acceptance 
and greater public satisfaction.”); cf. Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 57 (2006) 
(arguing that when people view authorities as legitimate, they are more likely to obey their 
rules). 
 40. The desire to do so, with the aim of automating law, has given fresh relevance to 
the “rules vs. standards” debates. Cf. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards, 
and Principles, Legal Theory Blog (Sept. 6, 2009), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/ 
2009/09/legal-theory-lexicon-rules-standards-and-principles.html [https://perma.cc/H55J-
4KEU] (summarizing the pros and cons of rules, standards, and principles). 
 41. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 15, at 18–22 (discussing ambiguities that arise in 
the context of translating health privacy law into code); id. at 24 (noting that litigants can 
disagree on the meaning of seemingly obvious words, such as “chicken”). But cf. Volokh, 
supra note 14, at 1138–39 (arguing that, if software can pass a “Modiﬁed John Henry 
Test,” where it performs at least as well as approximately ten average performers in a ﬁeld, 
it should be considered an adequate substitute for a human being, including a judge). 
 42. See Surden, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, supra note 3, at 1323 (“AI tends to work well 
for tasks that have deﬁnite right-or-wrong answers, and clear, unambiguous rules.”); see 
also Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 6–8 
(2011) (proposing guiding principles for automating legal reasoning, on the theory that 
some legal concepts are relatively determinable). 
 43. Lisa A. Shay, Woodrow Hartzog, John Nelson & Gregory Conti, Do Robots Dream 
of Electric Laws? An Experiment in the Law as Algorithm, in Robot Law 274, 275 (Ryan 
Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016). 
 44. Id. at 280. 
 45. Id. at 282–83. 
 46. Id. at 283–85. 
 47. Id. at 285–86. 
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while the “Intent of the Law” group averaged a mere 1.50 (standard 
deviation = 5.68) tickets for the same scenario.48 As the experiment’s 
authors concluded, “[E]ven relatively narrow and straightforward ‘rules’ 
can be troublingly indeterminate in practice.”49 And much of common 
law judging requires more than applying unambiguous rules.50 Can a 
program master analogical reasoning, with all of its nuanced distinctions 
and value judgments?51 Or apply the complex and changing 
understandings of “cruel and unusual punishment,” “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,” or other legal standards that are intentionally 
vague, as they were intended for “a world where law enforcement was 
imperfect or discretionary”?52 
Further, despite its veneer of objectivity, AI will not solve the prob-
lem of human bias; it incorporates human bias and adds other kinds. AI 
systems can produce biased results due to (1) preexisting bias, which is 
present in the training data sets and encoded in the system design; (2) 
technical bias, which emerges from a system’s limitations, such as loss of 
context and simpliﬁed formulations that accompany attempts to translate 
reality into code; and (3) emergent bias, which arises from user 
interaction with speciﬁc populations.53 These sources of bias afflict all AI 
systems, but some of these issues are extenuated in the context of judicial 
decisionmaking. Bias in many legal training data sets arises from the fact 
that “law is one of those domains where high-quality, machine-processa-
ble data is currently comparatively scarce except in particular niches.”54 
And, as noted above, bias in the system design arises because the same 
legal rule may be programmed differently—and those differences breed 
disparate and discriminatory impacts. Bias will also result from technical 
limitations, as evidenced by the New York traffic law example, and—to 
the extent the AI decisionmaker is a learning system—from interaction 
with judges and judged populations. 
Unintended glitches and intended interference from malicious ac-
tors create other potential sources of error.55 Any sufficiently complex 
system will have various parts that interact in unpredictable ways, and AI 
                                                                                                                           
 48. Id. at 289. 
 49. Id. at 278. 
 50. Cf. Pasquale, supra note 15, at 48 (“In both transactional and litigation contexts, 
it was almost impossible for any truly knowledgeable professional to boil down the sum 
total of their knowledge and judgment into a series of propositions applicable by 
machine.”). 
 51. Cass Sunstein, Of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. 
Roundtable 29, 33–34 (2001). 
 52. Christina Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to 
Use Technology, 14 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 36 (2018). 
 53. Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM 
Transactions on Info. Sys. 330, 333–36 (1996) (discussing preexisting bias, technical bias, 
and emergent bias). 
 54. Surden, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, supra note 3, at 1316. 
 55. Volokh, supra note 14, at 1171–73. 
2019] CYBORG JUSTICE 241 
 
programs regularly act unexpectedly, sometimes with dangerous results.56 
Judicial programs will also be a tempting target for entities immediately 
involved in a suit, politically motivated actors, and foreign entities intent 
on sowing illegitimacy.57 Granted, human judges may be inﬂuenced by 
threats, bribes, or internalized prejudice,58 but this is fundamentally dis-
tinct from the complete control that may be exercised over a hacked sys-
tem. Further, while both human and AI decisionmakers may be “gamed,” 
the erroneous decisions of human judges are contained (if just as critical 
to the parties to a suit),59 but scaling AI judges entails scaling their 
vulnerabilities and errors.60 
Nor will AI judges’ errors necessarily be identiﬁable.61 Depending on 
the structure of the algorithm, it may not be possible to plumb the 
“reasoning” behind a determination to understand where the error 
occurred.62 Some forms of AI are simply too complex to disentangle, 
while the structure of others render them just as opaque to their 
designers as a human brain. There are a few potential solutions to the 
explainability problem, including verifying purpose speciﬁcations or test-
ing inputs to see which factors affect outputs.63 However, in addition to 
technical barriers to transparency, trade secrets law and other legal 
                                                                                                                           
 56. See Joel Lehman, Jeff Clune & Dusan Misevic, The Surprising Creativity of Digital 
Evolution: A Collection of Anecdotes from the Evolutionary Computation and Artificial Life 
Research Communities 5 (2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.03453.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3RB6-8AJT] (“[A] well-known result in theoretical computer science is that . . . the outcome 
of a program cannot be predicted . . . .”). 
 57. See Volokh, supra note 14, at 1171–72; see also Miles Brundage et al., The Malicious 
Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation 16–22 (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07228.pdf [https://perma.cc/QSN2-WJV7] (noting the possible 
vulnerabilities of AI technologies to external attacks). 
 58. Volokh, supra note 14, at 1173. 
 59. But see id. at 1174 (observing that “many of the human judges’ prejudices and 
predictable errors are systemic”). 
 60. Id. (suggesting this makes them an even more appealing target). 
 61. Id. (noting that we are relatively accustomed to identifying and checking human 
judge errors). Extrapolating out, to the extent AI judges are employed and their errors are 
difficult to identify, their decisions may either be nonappealable or foster the development 
of an entirely new basis for appeals. (Thanks to Alicia Solow-Niederman for this point.) Cf. 
Mulligan, supra note 52, at 13 (discussing the difficulty of appealing citations from red 
light cameras, as opposed to those issued by human beings). 
 62. Selbst, Negligence, supra note 15, at 44–45. Granted, some have argued that 
there is no need to understand how a program actually reached a decision, provided it 
produces a sufficiently persuasive account of its reasoning. Volokh, supra note 14, at 1175–
76 (“Requiring that source code be published . . . may make it less likely that back doors 
will be effectively hidden, and may help expose inadvertent bugs as well.”). 
 63. E.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. 
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
633, 637 (2017) (describing “how technical tools for verifying the correctness of computer 
systems can be used to ensure that appropriate evidence exists for later oversight”); 
Volokh, supra note 14, at 1175–76 (discussing whether and to what extent AI judges might 
be made publicly accessible, to expose back doors, bugs, and emergent bias). 
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shields currently allow companies to refuse to disclose information 
needed for these evaluations.64 
There are real potential beneﬁts to employing AI in some sectors of 
judicial decisionmaking—but we are unlikely to see generalist, AI-only 
judges in the near future. Instead, as discussed below, AI is being 
incrementally integrated into adjudicatory systems, which raises other 
concerns. 
II. THE BEST OF BOTH? 
Judging in a common law system is a complex task that requires far 
more than mindlessly applying rules to fact patterns: “Rather, the 
decisionmaker is assessing the meaning of the facts and the meaning of 
the law in the situation”65 in the context of larger social norms and 
goals.66 Yet the discretion required for thoughtful judging imports a host 
of human biases and attendant unfairness. How to create a legal system 
that maximizes the best of both human and machine intelligence? 
The seemingly obvious solution: Cyborg justice! A legal system 
designed to take advantage of the strengths of both human beings and 
algorithms to efficiently increase access to justice with a base level of con-
sistency, while preserving the ﬂexibility to address unusual and extenuat-
ing circumstances.67 In many contexts, AI assistants already free human 
beings from mundane and time-consuming tasks,68 permitting us to 
                                                                                                                           
 64. Wexler, supra note 8, at 1349–50. 
 65. Pasquale, supra note 15, at 29–30. 
 66. Because “[l]aw as a social institution is multifaceted and embedded in particular 
political systems and traditions,” a technology that “reduces a legal relationship to a ‘clear 
prescription that exists prior to its application and that determines appropriate conduct or 
legal outcomes’” will be inherently ﬂawed. Id. at 45 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The 
Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1997)); 
see also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of 
Powerful Machines, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1249, 1298 (2017) (“To say that a problem is best 
resolved by prudence rather than principle is to express doubt about the possibility of 
fashioning second-order rules for navigating the collision between ﬁrst-order values. . . . 
When that happens, case-speciﬁc judgements—as opposed to generalized principles—
must carry the day.”); Wu, supra note 15, at 2005 (“Better results in hard cases may for a 
long time still depend instead on accessing something that remains, for now, human—that 
something variously known as moral reasoning, a sensitivity to evolving norms, or a prag-
matic assessment of what works.”). 
 67. See supra note 15. 
 68. AI assistants help us navigate the internet to answer questions, see, e.g., How Do 
Search Engines Use Artificial Intelligence?, LMGTFY, https://lmgtfy.com/?q=how+do+search+ 
engines+use+artifical+intelligence%3F&s=g [https://perma.cc/2534-MEY7] (last visited Aug. 
26, 2019); act as personal shoppers, see Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 Mich. 
L. Rev. 815, 817–22 (2019) (discussing the up- and downsides of the current and imminent 
proliferation of automated personal shoppers); drive our vehicles, see Nat’l Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Federal Automated Vehicles Policy 9–10 (2016), 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.p
df [https://perma.cc/WBE6-TCNZ] (discussing current and future levels of vehicle 
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better concentrate on our priorities and the elements of a decision that 
we do not wish to delegate.69 And human–machine teaming has enabled 
“centaur” chess teams to perform better than human or machine players 
alone.70 Similarly, teaming human judges with AI assistants may free hu-
man judges to be more thoughtful, just, and humane. 
Certainly, the use of AI decision assistants in judicial proceedings is 
unlikely to raise some of the issues associated with human–machine 
teaming in other contexts. Unlike piloting an airplane or engaging in 
active combat, there is little danger associated with unexpected 
communications breakdowns—the proceeding may be paused until the 
problem is resolved. And while superhuman reaction times may render 
human supervisors ineffectual and irrelevant in high-frequency trading71 
or responding to a cyberattack,72 there is no corresponding need for 
speed in the judicial context (as evidenced by many a backlog!). 
But while hybrid human–AI judicial systems would ideally maximize 
the strengths of human and machine intelligence, they may magnify the 
drawbacks of both.73 They also raise distinct “teaming” risks associated 
with overtrust, undertrust, and interface design issues, as well as second-
order structural side effects. 
To effectively participate in a human–machine team, the person in 
the loop must have an appropriately calibrated amount of trust. If the 
human being trusts the system too much, to the extent that they endorse 
an algorithm’s conclusion in the face of contradictory evidence or an 
                                                                                                                           
automation); offer medical advice to patients, Claudia E. Haupt, Artificial Professional Advice, 
18 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3400898 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); and diagnoses to doctors and patients, 
A. Michael Froomkin, Ian R. Kerr & Joelle Pineau, When AIs Outperform Doctors: 
Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 33, 39 (2019); W. Nicolson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3–4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347890 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 69. Cf. Scharre, supra note 15, at 154–55 (discussing the various roles humans play in 
target selection and engagement—essential operator, moral agent, and fail-safe—and 
arguing that automated assistants could allow human operators to focus on the latter two). 
 70. Mike Cassidy, Centaur Chess Brings Out the Best in Humans and Machines, The 
Bloomreach (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.bloomreach.com/en/blog/2014/12/centaur-
chess-brings-best-humans-machines.html [https://perma.cc/V947-ZWX5]. 
 71. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n & SEC, Findings Regarding the Market 
Events of May 6, 2010, at 1–3 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents- 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7HC-23B4] (describing the “flash crash,” when the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average lost over one trillion dollars over the course of a half hour). 
 72. See Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in 
Cyberspace, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 565, 580 (2018) (“The speed of cyber will nearly always 
require that in-the-moment defenses [to cyberattacks] be automated or autonomous.”). 
 73. See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 284–85 (noting that hybrid 
human–AI judicial systems may result in the “worst of both worlds” if the wrong policy 
trade-offs are struck—and that market forces, rather than considered or democratic 
evaluation, are likely to dictate design choices). 
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obviously unfair result, the human in the loop isn’t performing their 
needed role. Such overtrust—which is related to “automation bias”—
risks both overreliance74 and skill fade.75 If we wish to elicit the beneﬁts 
of human reasoning,76 teaming systems must be designed so that the 
human in the loop understands the AI program’s capabilities and limita-
tions, has reason to exercise valued human skills, and is actively engaged 
in the decisionmaking process. Absent this, the person may become little 
more than a ﬁgurehead (or scapegoat, should something go wrong).77 
Meanwhile, although undertrust—an unwillingness to accept an algo-
rithm’s determinations—can be useful,78 if the human judges do not 
trust their AI counterparts, we may overinvest in useless or even harmful 
infrastructure. One of the aims of incorporating AI into a judicial process 
is to identify relevant but counterintuitive indicia. But if the human in 
the loop sometimes employs that information (due to justiﬁed trust or 
overtrust) and sometimes ignores that information (due to undertrust or 
alert fatigue), that discrepancy may introduce more unpredictability into 
the decisionmaking process than a human judge acting alone.79 Finally, 
in all too many cases, interface design issues have fostered overtrust in 
the machine system, sometimes resulting in tragedy.80 Given how much 
can be lost in translation when human and machine intelligences ex-
change information, the interface must be designed to both convey 
information and appropriately calibrate trust. 
We learn to trust through experience: Only after repeated engage-
ments do we determine whether and when another entity can be trusted 
                                                                                                                           
 74. See Scharre, supra note 15, at 158 (discussing how human operators of the 
Patriot air defense system trusted it too much, leading to two 2003 fratricides); P.W. Singer, 
Robots at War: The New Battleﬁeld, Wilson Q., Winter 2009, at 30, 40 (recounting the role 
overtrust played in the USS Vincennes’s downing of a civilian passenger jet). 
 75. See Steve Casner, Dumbing It Down in the Cockpit, Slate (Dec. 12, 2014), https:// 
slate.com/technology/2014/12/automation-in-the-cockpit-is-making-pilots-thinking-skills-
duller.html [https://perma.cc/8QP2-XSUT] (discussing how pilots’ ability to interpret unusual 
data and to independently keep track of their location worsened after the introduction of 
autopilots). 
 76. See Wu, supra note 15, at 2015 (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *40; 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 23–28, 81–88 (1977)). 
 77. See Madeleine Clare Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-
Robot Interaction, Engaging Sci. Tech. & Soc’y, 2019, at 40, 41–42, https://estsjournal. 
org/index.php/ests/article/view/260/177 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“I 
articulate the idea of a moral crumple zone to describe how responsibility for an action may 
be misattributed to a human actor who had limited control over the behavior of an auto-
mated or autonomous system.”). 
 78. See Marc Bennetts, Soviet Officer Who Averted Cold War Nuclear Disaster Dies Aged 
77, Guardian (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/18/soviet-
officer-who-averted-cold-war-nuclear-disaster-dies-aged-77 [https://perma.cc/7KM7-D68V] 
(recounting how Stanislav Petrov likely averted nuclear war when he determined that the re-
ported launch of U.S. missiles was actually a malfunction of the Soviet early warning system). 
 79. Thanks to Richard Re for this point. 
 80. See Elish, supra note 77, at 44, 46 (discussing how interface design issues contrib-
uted to the Three Mile Island and Air France Flight 447 accidents). 
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with a particular task.81 But while experimentation is critical to calibrat-
ing trust, “it is difficult to experiment in a space where human liberties 
are at stake.”82 So while we want hybrid human–AI judicial systems to fail 
enough to enable the human team member to calibrate trust appropri-
ately and stay sufficiently actively engaged to prevent skill fade, we don’t 
want them to fail in ways that harm litigants or replicate human discre-
tion issues that these systems are intended to correct. This will be a chal-
lenging needle to thread. 
Hybrid human–AI judicial systems may spur structural changes. We 
have traditionally celebrated equitable decisionmaking, which values 
discretion, tailoring, and mercy. However, AI systems naturally favor 
codiﬁed justice, which values measurability, objectivity, and empiricism. 
The more we incorporate AI systems in the common law process, the 
more we will encourage a shift in societal values and expectations around 
adjudication.83 This may alter the judiciary’s composition: If judgment is 
increasingly understood as rote application of rules to facts, rather than a 
complex weighing of equitable values and pronouncement of social 
norms, the “appeal of being a human judge may dwindle,” which will 
affect the composition of the bench.84 
Further, depending on whether hybrid human–AI judicial systems 
are embedded in the market or a government decisionmaking structure, 
their decisions will be monitored differently, which may incentivize 
counterintuitive or undesirable actions.85 For example, many market 
decisionmaking systems, like TurboTax, will be challenged when they un-
dercomply with the law; in contrast, government decisionmaking systems, 
like one that determines welfare beneﬁts, will be challenged when they 
overcomply by adopting strict interpretations of requirements.86 This will 
incentivize market decisionmaking systems to overcomply and govern-
ment decisionmaking systems to undercomply with their respective 
governing rules.87 Relatedly, if human judges face more scrutiny and cri-
tique should they decide against an algorithm’s recommendation, they 
will be consciously and unconsciously incentivized to favor it. 
                                                                                                                           
 81. See Martin & Waldman, supra note 15, at 7–8 (distinguishing between disposi-
tional, situational, and learned trust). 
 82. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 289. 
 83. See id. at 259–60 (“In short, AI adjudication’s early affinity with codiﬁed justice 
will both accelerate the technology’s adoption and encourage its development in ways 
inimical to equitable justice.”); id. at 288–89 (“Increasing use of AI adjudication will 
fundamentally alter practical capabilities, institutional incentives, power relationships, 
and, ultimately, the views [of the law] of experts and laypersons alike.”). Such a shift would 
alter how society views adjudication and its purposes. Id. (detailing possible implications). 
 84. Id. at 273–74. 
 85. See Susan C. Morse, When Robots Make Legal Mistakes, 72 Okla. L. Rev. 213, 230 
(2019). 
 86. Id. at 215. 
 87. Id. at 216. 
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Simultaneously, these systems will likely continue the trend of “the 
‘law’ of the ﬁrm”—industry lawmaking, monitoring, and enforce-
ment88—replacing the “law of the state,” as companies use technology to 
assume roles once reserved to states and state actors.89 For example, 
Facebook is creating a “content review board, designed to rule on the 
hardest of speech-related questions,”90 institutionalizing a second U.S. 
system to adjudicate disputes about harmful speech.91 The board’s deci-
sions may create inﬂuential precedent that affects the public 
understanding and social construction of the First Amendment. 
The following Part considers another possible side effect of hybrid 
human–AI judicial systems: the likelihood of legal stagnation, as 
technological–legal lock-in increases barriers to common law evolution. 
III. TECHNOLOGICAL–LEGAL LOCK-IN 
The common law has long been celebrated for combining stability 
with the ability to adapt to social shifts and new technologies.92 It evolves 
                                                                                                                           
 88. Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. 
Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 142, 143 (2004) [hereinafter Radin, Regulation by 
Contract]; see also Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts, 69 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 
2019) [hereinafter Crootof, Internet of Torts] (manuscript at 3–10), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3342499 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing how terms of service 
and Internet of Things devices grant companies a newfound power to create governance 
rules, monitor compliance, and enforce consequences for violations). 
 89. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1601–03 (2018) (highlighting how the 
content moderation policies of online platforms are shaping what speech is allowed in the 
public sphere); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, 
and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 1621, 1625–27 (2018) 
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5, at 549–54 (discussing how companies’ internal dispute processes are replacing arbitra-
tion and trials). For a vision of how industry and states might work together to govern the 
algorithms, see Kaminski, supra note 13 (manuscript at 108). 
 90. Wu, supra note 15, at 2004–05; see also Anupam Chander, A Facebook Supreme 
Court?, Balkinization (May 31, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/05/a-facebook-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/3BE3-97Q9] (outlining alternatives to Facebook’s 
content review board and concluding that “a Facebook Supreme Court is the worst idea, 
except for all the others”). 
 91. See Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and 
Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 23), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3332530 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing two 
governance systems: a public one for torts in courts and a private one for content moderation 
on online platforms); Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan, Knight First Amend. Inst. (Oct. 1, 
2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/facebook-v-sullivan [https://perma.cc/GML5-
GU92] (noting that “the United States now has two systems to adjudicate disputes arising 
from harmful speech about other people” and discussing what actors in each system can 
learn from the other). 
 92. See, e.g., Comment, The Dead Hand of the Common Law, 27 Yale L.J. 668, 672 
(1918). 
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gradually and organically, responding to new problems ﬁrst with analo-
gies and then with revised rules. Precedential cases gain strength by vir-
tue of being built upon: While none of the cases in a particular chain 
may be weighty enough to be memorialized in a casebook, incremental 
changes in interpretations and applications can dramatically shift or 
fundamentally set the path of the law.93 Meanwhile, human judges are 
regularly “updating.”94 Individuals are “expose[d] to new information 
and experiences,” while “turnover from career changes, retirement, and 
mortality mean that the bench is in a constant state of generational 
ﬂux.”95 
Both legal stability and legal evolution are critical to law’s legitimacy. 
Predictable decisions comporting with prior ones creates the legitimacy 
associated with time-tested rules and the fairness of like cases being 
treated similarly; ﬂexible applications of those rules are necessary to 
accommodate changing social norms and extenuating circumstances in 
particular cases. 
But hybrid human–AI judicial systems risk fostering stability at the 
expense of evolution.96 As laws, norms, policies, and decision processes 
are translated into algorithmic programs, they are cemented. Although 
regulation by code has been celebrated for its ﬂexibility,97 the technolog-
ical, economic, and political ediﬁces within which code is entrenched 
may be far more rigid. Path dependence, bureaucratic inertia, and 
special interest lobbying by concentrated groups may make it just as 
difficult to change algorithms implementing law as it already is to change 
written law, creating a kind of “technological deep state” that resists a 
new administration’s desired policy changes. 
Further, regulation by code is arguably harder to change than prece-
dent or statutes because—like other forms of architectural regulation—it 
constructs and constricts our options while remaining hidden.98 We are 
aware that laws are passed or modiﬁed through interpretation, that social 
norms change from community to community, and that prices are set. 
Architectural regulation is far more insidious, as it can cloak nudges and 
                                                                                                                           
 93. Cf. Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. App. Prac. & Process 153, 153 
(2013) (discussing how nonprecedential decisions act as precedent and, over time, can 
magnify ambiguities and mistakes). 
 94. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 268–69. 
 95. Id. 
 96. These concerns are equally—if not more—applicable to AI-based adjudicatory 
systems that do not have a human in the loop. But, for reasons articulated above, we are 
far more likely to have hybrid human–AI judicial systems than AI judges in the near 
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 97. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, at 139 (2006). 
 98. See id. at 136–37. Of course, architectural regulation can be made obvious, as 
anyone who has faced a password request or had speedbumps installed on a familiar route 
can attest. 
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mandates with the legitimacy of apparent self-determination.99 After 
1948, for example, communities built highways, laid railroad tracks, and 
created zoning constraints to fortify segregation, enabling “what would 
clearly be an illegal and controversial regulation without even having to 
admit any regulation exists.”100 While the segregating effects of these 
architectural decisions are still felt today, it is easy to forget that they were 
constructed. Instead, “[t]he continuing segregation of these communi-
ties is described as the product of ‘choice.’”101 Similarly, digital code di-
rects and limits what we can do online102—and, as more and more items 
are added to the “Internet of Things,” code increasingly determines what 
we can do in the physical world.103 
Nor will the AI programs in the system automatically update over 
time.104 Pattern-recognition AI systems are trained on past data to predict 
future success—but while they may be excellent at identifying traits that 
were once relevant in achieving a goal, AI programs cannot easily adapt 
what once worked to new situations.105 Instead, they reﬂect back prior 
human bias, as when Amazon’s CV-reviewing program learned to penal-
ize women candidates based on initial training data about who had tradi-
tionally been successful in the company.106 To minimize this issue, the AI 
                                                                                                                           
 99. See id. at 136 (noting that, by regulating indirectly through code, governments 
“can achieve regulatory ends, often without suffering the political consequences that the 
same ends, pursued directly, would yield”). 
 100. Id. at 135. To the extent architectural regulation obscures accountability, it im-
pedes public knowledge, granting additional information advantages to interest groups. 
Cf. BJ Ard, The Limits of Industry-Speciﬁc Privacy Law, 51 Idaho L. Rev. 607, 615 (2015) 
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 101. Lessig, supra note 97, at 136. 
 102. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 210, 224–25 
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reliance on, smart devices); Crootof, Internet of Torts, supra note 88 (manuscript at 23–
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 104. See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 269; see also Volokh, supra note 14, 
at 1187–88 (proposing that AI judges be replaced every three years to accommodate 
changing attitudes about legal values). 
 105. See Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 245 n.9; cf. Rise of the Machines, 
Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal, https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/rise-of-the-
machines [https://perma.cc/K7JH-E6V9] (last visited Aug. 26, 2019). 
 106. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against 
Women, Reuters (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-
automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-
idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/6UTX-RJDZ]; see also Re & Solow-Niederman, supra 
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in the system will need to be regularly retrained on updated data, but 
absent enforced requirements for frequent updates and some form of 
planned obsolescence—as well as a dedicated budget line for both—
hybrid human–AI judicial systems are likely to remain consistently 
behind the times. 
But won’t the human in the loop correct for this issue? Of course, 
human beings will continue to “update” over time, both as individuals 
and collectively.107 But one of the aims of hybrid human–AI judicial sys-
tems was to minimize human discretion, save for outlier cases. However, 
social shifts will render some apparently unfair decisions common and 
systemic, rather than aberrations or exceptional cases justifying human 
override.108 Alternatively, thanks to the insidious nature of architectural 
regulation, judges and others who interact with AI decision assistants in 
the adjudicatory process may come to accept their biases, nudges, and 
limitations as the natural, and possibly only, way of structuring the pro-
cess.109 Additionally, some combination of overtrust, skill fade, and shifts 
in who becomes a judge and what kind of justice is valued110 may affect 
how likely a human being is to question an AI’s recommendation or call 
for an override, even when the program’s determination is clearly 
problematic. 
Granted, there are potential beneﬁts that accompany technological–
legal lock-in. Just as Odysseus’s choice to be lashed to the mast was a 
manifestation of his autonomy, and just as states’ acceptance of the 
obligations and responsibilities detailed in difficult-to-modify constitu-
tions and treaties is an expression of their sovereignty, societies can de-
cide to elevate certain rules or avoid erosion of certain norms through 
                                                                                                                           
note 15, at 273 & n.108 (“AI adjudication, in other words, could cast a bright light on human 
adjudication—and people might not like what they see.”). 
 107. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 249–50. 
 108. Cf. Deborah J. Vagins & Jesselyn McCurdy, ACLU, Cracks in the System: 20 Years of 
the Unjust Federal Crack Cocaine Law 2 (2006), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/ 
field_document/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJA7-8PR4] (discussing the 
example of how cocaine possession statutory sentences differed dramatically, depending on 
whether it was sold in solid or powder form). 
 109. While this Piece is primarily concerned with the role of the human judge in the 
hybrid human–AI judicial system, the design of digital decisionmaking environments will 
also inﬂuence litigants, particularly self-represented parties. Ayelet Sela, e-Nudging Justice: 
The Role of Digital Choice Architecture in Online Courts, 2 J. Disp. Resol. 127, 128–29 
(2019) (arguing that, “[w]hether purposefully or inadvertently, the design of digital envi-
ronments often steers their users’ behavior” in ways that are nontransparent and some-
times manipulative, requiring online court designers to take care that the architecture 
comport with the core values of the judicial system). 
 110. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 274 (“[T]he ultimate effect [of hybrid 
human–AI judicial systems] would be a set of human judges who have less inﬂuence, 
authority, and moxie. Judges might more rarely exercise equitable discretion, and more 
frequently rely on codiﬁed legal rules and standardized norms.”). 
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legal codiﬁcation.111 Further, thoughtful limitation can sometimes result 
in more generativity: Poets can ﬁnd that the constraints of the sonnet, 
limerick, or haiku forms free them to be more creative in other ways, 
while programming or application advances may depend upon locked-in 
standards or sub-levels.112 If the design allows for it, judges may be incen-
tivized to “innovate” within the structures necessitated by human–machine 
teaming. 
But there are also obvious problems. Who decides what gets locked 
in, what are their biases, and what are they incentivized to prioritize? 
Today, all too often, proﬁt-motivated ﬁrms are making these determina-
tions,113 raising all of the issues associated with prioritizing the law of the 
ﬁrm, which aims to proﬁt the ﬁrm, over the law of the state, which re-
ﬂects varied interests and presumably exists to beneﬁt the general pub-
lic.114 Even if these decisions are instead vested with democratically-
elected legislative bodies, and assuming that technologists can adequately 
translate desired policy into digital code, the legislature of the moment 
will be privileged at the expense of future polities. And regardless of 
which entity is making these determinations, technological–legal lock-in 
will entrench today’s biases, resulting in legal decisions that are increas-
ingly out of step with future social norms. 
CONCLUSION 
Fully aware of the importance of legal evolution, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote: 
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried 
changes in laws and constitutions. . . . But I know also, that laws 
and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlight-
ened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and 
manners and opinions change with the change of circum-
stances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the 
times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat 
which ﬁtted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever 
under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.115 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Id. at 288 (suggesting that “[e]quity-preserving code” could “serv[e] as a bulwark 
against the erosion of equitable justice that would take place in a totally open ‘market for 
justice’”). 
 112. Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It 63–64 (2008). 
 113. In many cases, industry is developing automated complaint-resolution mecha-
nisms to serve its own purposes. See, e.g., Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, supra 
note 5, at 564–65. AI-adjudication developers also have incentives that may be at odds with 
traditional judicial values. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 14, at 272. 
 114. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 88, at 147. 
 115. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to “Henry Tompkinson” (Samuel Kercheval) (July 
12, 1816), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-0128-0002 [https:// 
perma.cc/P272-VXTD]; see also Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 3 (2011) (arguing that 
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Given their sensitivity to changing social norms,116 human judges are 
uniquely able to oversee legal evolution and ensure that our judicial sys-
tem “keep[s] pace with the times.”117 Accordingly, to the extent they are 
employed, hybrid human–AI judicial systems must be designed to ensure 
opportunities for human judges to engage in the value balancing and 
norm incorporation necessary to maintain an evolving and legitimate 
common law.  
                                                                                                                           
the U.S. Constitution is best understood as an incomplete framework for government, de-
signed to be built out over time). 
 116. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 350 (1986). 
 117. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 66, at 1256 (discussing, in the context of crimi-
nal justice, how judges are able “to consider the plurality of values implicated by the exer-
cise of state power” and “to resolve conﬂicts between those values in a context-sensitive 
way”); id. (“[T]he rationale for individualized review, costly and inefficient as it may be, is 
that in some settings we cannot be sure in advance which values will be implicated by the exercise 
of power. And when that is true, decisionmaking resists automation.”); see also Volokh, 
supra note 14, at 1183 (noting that, to the extent common law development requires 
prediction, we may never have Supreme Court or appellate-level AI judges). 
